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Can heuristic information processing affect important product markets? We explore whether the tendency
to focus on the left-most digit of a number affects how used car buyers incorporate odometer values
in their purchase decisions. Analyzing over 22 million wholesale used-car transactions, we find substantial
evidence of this left-digit bias; there are large and discontinuous drops in sale prices at 10,000-mile
thresholds in odometer mileage, along with smaller drops at 1,000-mile thresholds. We obtain estimates
for the inattention parameter in a simple model of this left-digit bias. We also investigate whether this
heuristic behavior is primarily attributable to the final used-car customers or the used-car salesmen
who buy cars in the wholesale market. The evidence is most consistent with partial inattention by final
customers. We discuss the significance of these results for the literature on inattention and point to
other market settings where this type of heuristic thinking may be important. Our results suggest that
information-processing heuristics may be important even in markets with large stakes and where information
is easy to observe.
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Although economic models are usually based on the assumption that agents are unconstrained in 
their ability to process information, economists have long recognized that individuals have limited 
cognitive  abilities  (Simon,  1955).  An  extensive  literature  on  heuristics  and  biases,  originating 
primarily  in  psychology,  has  shown  that  people  often  use  simple  cognitive  shortcuts  when 
processing information, leading to systematic biases in decision making.
1 There is large evidence on 
the nature of these heuristics from surveys and laboratory experiments, but there has been much less 
research exploring whether these cognitive limitations impact important market settings. 
  In  this  paper,  we  study  the  effects  of  heuristic  information  processing  in  the  used-car 
market. We investigate whether the market is affected by consumers exhibiting a heuristic known as 
left-digit bias when they incorporate odometer mileages into their decision process. Left-digit bias is 
the  tendency  to  focus  on  the  left-most  digit  of  a  number  while  partially  ignoring  other  digits 
(Korvost and Damian, 2008; Poltrock and Schwartz, 1984). We develop a simple model of left-digit 
bias patterned after the model of inattention presented by DellaVigna (2009). The model predicts 
that,  if  consumers  use  this  heuristic  when  processing  odometer  values,  cars  will  exhibit 
discontinuous drops in value at mileage thresholds where left digits change (e.g., 10,000-mile marks). 
Using a rich and novel dataset on more than 22 million used-car transactions from wholesale 
auctions, we show that there are clear threshold effects at 10,000-mile marks. These discontinuous 
drops in value are evident in simple graphs of the raw data. For example, cars with odometer values 
between 79,900 and 79,999 miles are sold on average for approximately $210 more than cars with 
odometer values between 80,000 and 80,100 miles, but for only $10 less than cars with odometer 
readings between 79,800 and 79,899. Regression analyses show significant price discontinuities at 
each 10,000-mile threshold from 10,000 to 100,000 miles. The size of the discontinuities is similar 
across each threshold, consistently on the order of $150 to $200. Consistent with our model, we also 
find smaller price discontinuities at 1,000-mile thresholds.  
  The left-digit bias we identify in this paper not only influences wholesale prices but also 
affects  supply  decisions.  If  sellers  are  savvy  and  aware  of  threshold  effects,  they  will  have  an 
incentive to bring cars to auction before the vehicle‟s mileage crosses a threshold. Indeed we show 
that there are large volume spikes in cars before 10,000-mile thresholds. 
                                                           
1 See Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman (2002) for a review. 2 
 
These volume spikes, however, also make the task of identifying unbiased estimates of the 
price drops at thresholds more difficult. Because of the seller response to threshold effects, it is 
necessary to account for potential selection in our analysis, and we do so in several different ways. 
First, we present our findings after controlling for selection on observables, including fixed effects 
for the combination of make, model, model year, body style of a car, and auction year. In our most 
restrictive specification, we are able to identify the impact of crossing a 10,000-mile threshold by 
comparing cars of the same make, model, model year, body style, and that are brought to auction by 
the same seller in a given year. We also run our analyses separately for different types of sellers at the 
auctions. All of the buyers at the wholesale auctions are licensed used-car dealers, but sellers can be 
both  car  dealers  and  companies  with  fleets  of  cars,  such  as  leasing  companies  and  rental-car 
companies. We show that the selection varies considerably across these seller types and yet we find 
similar price discontinuities for both types. We also discuss additional selection issues and present a 
range of evidence suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely to affect our findings. 
We perform further checks in order to allay concerns that the observed threshold effects 
might be a result of institutional features related to the used car market. The results are robust to 
considering a number of alternative explanations, such as the potential for odometer tampering and 
the structure of car warranties. We also test a secondary prediction of our model; because inattention 
leads to discontinuous changes in perceived mileage around thresholds, the price discontinuities at 
these thresholds should be larger for cars that are depreciating at a faster rate (i.e., those more 
affected by mileage changes). Indeed we find larger price discontinuities for cars that depreciate 
quickly (e.g., Hummers) than for cars that depreciate slowly (e.g., Honda Accords). Finally, we use a 
smaller sample from Canadian data to construct a type of placebo test. We find price discontinuities 
in Canadian used-car auctions at the 10,000-kilometer marks, but not at the 10,000-mile marks.  
  The particular setting of our study – the wholesale used-car market – allows us to at least 
partially investigate the influence of heuristic information processing on different economic agents. 
The price discontinuities in the wholesale market may arise because used-car dealers who buy at the 
auctions recognize that their final customers will exhibit the left-digit bias and purchase cars at the 
auction accordingly. It is also possible, however, that it is the used car dealers themselves who are 
subject  to  the  left-digit  bias.  It  is  not  easy  to  disentangle  these  cases  because  there  is  little 
observational difference between the two. However, we can address whether inattention seems to be 
driven primarily by used-car dealers or final customers. A range of evidence – including volume 
patterns, purchase patterns for experienced versus inexperienced dealers at the auctions, pricing 3 
 
dynamics right before thresholds, and data from an online retail used-car market – are all suggestive 
that our findings are driven by limited attention of the final used-car customers.  
  Our research is related to a growing body of literature that studies how inattention impacts 
market  outcomes.  Gabaix  and  Laibson‟s  (2006)  work  on  shrouded  attributes  and  Mullainathan, 
Schwartzstein, and Shleifer‟s (2008) work on coarse thinking provide general frameworks for the 
type of inattention we consider here. Our paper is also related to recent empirical work by Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft (2009), Finkelstein (2009), Hossain and Morgan (2006), Brown, Hossain, and 
Morgan (2010), Lee and Malmendier (forthcoming), Englmaier and Schmoller (2008, 2009), and 
Pope (2009). These papers find evidence of consumer inattention in market settings.
2 Most of this 
existing evidence comes from settings where certain product attributes are shrouded or hidden in 
some way. Even in the cases within this literature where relevant information is not hidden, there is 
a  sense  that  people  would  “need  to  know”  to  look  for  or  use  the  information.  For  example, 
Englmaier and Schmoller (2008, 2009) and Pope (2009) show that people tend to use convenient 
summary measures in market settings even when finer-level information underlying that summary 
measure is informative and readily available.
3 In our study, odometer mileage is not shrouded and is 
clearly being used by market participants to determine their willingness to pay for a car. Our results 
suggest  that  a  natural  information-processing  heuristic  can  limit  the  extent  to  which  market 
participants incorporate even the information they are actively observing. As such, our findings 
expand the implications of the literature on limited attention in market settings. Furthermore, used 
cars are valuable durable goods, and buyers typically invest significant time and effort in the process 
of  buying  them.
4  This  suggests  that  information-processing  heuristics  can  be  important  beyond 
settings where consumers are making quick and unconsidered decisions.  
  Our  paper  is  also  linked  to  this  existing  literature  because  we  use  the  same  modeling 
framework  for  inattention  and  use  our  data  to  generate  structural  estimates  of  the  inattention 
parameter. In our benchmark specification we estimate a value for the inattention parameter of 0.31, 
which in our setting implies that approximately 30% of the reduction in value caused by increased 
                                                           
2 For evidence of the effects of limited attention in financial markets, see Cohen and Frazzini (2008), DellaVigna and 
Pollet (2007, 2009), and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). 
3 Englmaier and Schmoller (2009), is particularly related to our work, as they show that the asking prices for used cars in 
an online market adjust discontinuously to registration-year changes even though there is information available on the 
website about the exact date of first registration for a car. They, too, find sizeable economic magnitudes of inattention in 
the used car market. 
4 For example, JD Powers‟ Autoshopper.com Study for 2003 reports that the average amount of time automotive 
internet shoppers spent shopping for cars was over 5 hours, and that these customers visited, on average, over 10 
different websites before making their purchase decision. 4 
 
mileage on a car will occur at salient mileage thresholds. Although the degree of inattention is likely 
to  be  context-specific,  we  can  compare  our  estimate  of  inattention  to  those  elaborated  by 
DellaVigna (2009). He reports estimates of the inattention parameter ranging from 0.18 to 0.45 for 
the work of Hosain and Morgan (2006) on inattention to shipping charges on Ebay, from 0.46 to 
0.59 for the study of DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) on inattention to earnings announcements, and 
0.75 for the field experiment of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) on non-transparent sales taxes. 
  Finally, our paper is related to the literature on 99-cent pricing (Basu, 1997, 2006; Ginzberg, 
1936), which typically assumes left-digit bias causes the prevalence of prices ending with 99 cents 
(e.g., $3.99).
5 Our work provides a somewhat cleaner setting in which to test the impacts of this 
heuristic  on  market  outcomes.  In  most  models  of  99-cent  pricing,  a  rational-expectations 
equilibrium results when all firms use 99-cent pricing; therefore, all customers expect such pricing 
and cannot benefit from paying attention to the full price. Thus, inattention can lead to 99-cent 
pricing, but ubiquitous 99-cent pricing can also cause rational inattention. In contrast, our paper 
analyzes a market where buyers could benefit from timing their purchases around thresholds. The 
durable-good nature of used cars also ensures that anyone who buys a car with mileage just below a 
threshold will soon see that car cross the threshold. In this paper, therefore, we are able to get a 
sense of the cost that a given car buyer incurs due to inattention generated by left-digit bias.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a simple model of left-digit bias and 
discusses  its  predictions  for  used-car  values  and  wholesale-auction  prices  in  a  competitive 
environment. Section 3 describes the data used in our analyses and presents summary statistics. 
Section 4 presents our empirical results, including a variety of robustness checks and additional 
analyses. Section 5 reports our estimates of the level of inattention, while Section 6 discusses the 
incidence of inattention on the different actors in the used-car market. We conclude the paper in 
Section 7 with a brief discussion of the broader implications of this research for other industries and 
settings, and of the question whether we should think of this as a case of “rational inattention.” 
 
2. Model 
In order to structure our thinking about the left-digit bias and its effects in the used-car market, we 
lay out a simple model of consumer inattention to a continuous quality metric, and then incorporate 
it into a market setting for used cars. 
                                                           
5 Prices of initial public offerings also seem to converge on integer values (Kandel et al., 2001; Bradley et al., 2004). 5 
 
2.1 Consumer inattention to continuous metrics 
Our  model  follows  the  frameworks  developed  by  Chetty  et  al.  (2009),  DellaVigna  (2009)  and 
Finkelstein (2009), where an individual pays full attention to the visible component of a relevant 
variable and only partial attention to the more opaque component of that variable. We apply this 
approach to model how people with a left-digit bias process numbers. Any number can be broken 
down as the sum of its assorted base-10 digits. Consistent with the left-digit bias reported in a 
number of studies (Korvost and Damian, 2008; Poltrock and Schwartz, 1984), we assume that the 
left-most digit of a number that a person observes is fully processed whereas the person may display 
(partial) inattention to digits further to the right. 
  Formally, let m be an observed continuous quality metric (in our case miles), H be the base-
10  power  of  the  left-most,  non-zero  digit  of  m,  and  dH  be  the  value  of  that  digit,  such  that
{1,2,...,9} H d  . The perceived metric     is then given by: 
                                       
    ,           (1) 
where           is the inattention parameter. As an example, consider the case where m takes on the 
value 49,000. From Equation 1, this would be processed as                              
  We can consider how different the perceived measure will be on either side of a left-digit 
change by focusing on how     changes as the metric m ranges from, say, 40,000 to 50,000. As long 
as m is below 50,000, the decision-maker will perceive a change of (1-θ) for every 1-unit increase in 
m. However, when crossing over the threshold from 49,999 to 50,000, the change in perceived value 
will be 1 + θ*9,999 or, in the limit, θ*10,000. The change in the left digit brings the perceived 
measure in line with its actual value (because all digits except for the left-most one are zero) and 
induces a discontinuous change in the perceived value.  
  Figure 1 shows the effect that this inattention would have in the basic case in which the 
perceived value    of a product is a linear function of the perceived metric    :  
                                          (2) 
We assume a negative slope (as expressed by   ) to match the used-car setting and demonstrate 
how this value function would look over a range of m from 60,000 to 100,000. The graph shows that 
the perceived value displays discontinuities at each 10,000 threshold. Because the value function is 
linear, the size of these discontinuities is constant and equal to (αθ)*10,000. 
In the case of used cars, then, Figure 1 reveals a few basic predictions of the model. First, 
and most importantly, if customers are inattentive to digits in the mileage (i.e., θ >0), there will be 6 
 
discontinuities in the perceived value of cars at 10,000-mile thresholds. In the limit as θ goes to 1 
and consumers are attentive only to the left-most digit, the value function will be a step function. 
The second prediction is that, if the linear-value function holds, the size of these discontinuities will 
be constant across thresholds changes of the same size that induce a change in the left-most digit. 
Also, cars with a steeper slope of depreciation (i.e., larger  ) will have larger price discontinuities. 
Finally, holding fixed the inattention parameter, the model here predicts the same discontinuous 
drop in prices at the 100,000 mark that is observed at the 10,000 marks from 10,000 through 90,000. 
Since  the  10,000-mile  marks  after  100,000  involve  changes  in  digits  beyond  the  left-most,  the 
discontinuities at those points may differ from the 10,000-mile marks prior to 100,000. Of course, 
there is no reason to suspect a priori that the exact functional form in Equation 1 is appropriate. In 
particular Equation 1 assumes that the individual is equally inattentive to all digits past the left-most 
digit. A reasonable alternative would be decreasing attention to digits further to the right. This could 
be captured by a reformulation of Equation 1 to:   
                                                                          .        (3) 
As an example, consider the number 49,900 and assume that 1=2; using Equation 3, this would be 
processed  as                                           .  With  this  specification,  unlike 
Equation  1,  we  would  expect  to  see  discontinuities  at  each  digit  threshold,  with  smaller 
discontinuities for smaller thresholds. Although not a primary focus of this paper, our empirical 
analysis allows us to shed light on the extent of increasing inattention to “smaller” digits. 
This model has the implication that limited attention always results in the perceived mileage 
being less than or equal to the actual mileage. Although that feature matches our intuition about the 
nature of left-digit bias, an alternative would be to assume that individuals act as if the perceived 
mileage were equal to some benchmark like the midpoint of a range (e.g., 9,500). All of the basic 
predictions of the  model would  hold  in  this alternative  framework.  The absolute  values of the 
perceived worth of the car would be affected by the exact nature of inattention, but the relative 
values would not, and it is the prediction on relative values that we test empirically.
6  
  To provide more direct support for the mechanism behind our conceptual approach to the 
left-digit bias, we provide evidence from a survey that we conducted with undergraduate students, 
where they were provided information about two hypothetical compact cars. The mileage of these 
                                                           
6 This distinction could matter, in our empirical setting if car dealers can selectively de-bias customers. In that case, dealers 
could point out the true mileage to buyers who perceived mileage to be higher than it actually is. We suspect that this 
type of selective de-biasing is difficult in practice. Empirically such a dynamic should produce price schedules that are 
convex within 10,000-mileage bands and we see no evidence of that pattern.  7 
 
cars was randomized across 4 different mileage pairs (62,113 and 89,847; 62,847 and 89,113; 69,113 and 
82,847;  and  69,847  and  82,113).  After  stating  which  car  they  were  more  likely  to  purchase,  the 
information about the cars disappeared and students were asked to recall the exact mileage of each 
car they had just seen, or to guess a number that was as close as possible to the actual mileage if they 
did not recall it. Although this recall task is not identical to the mental process a car buyer may 
follow when purchasing a used car, the results are broadly consistent with our framework. Students 
exhibited a left-digit bias in that they were able to recall the first digit of the mileage over 90% of the 
time, the second digit just over 50% of the time, and the remaining digits less than 15% of the time. 
Moreover, participants consistently underestimated mileage for cars with true mileages approaching 
a 10,000-mile threshold (69,113, 69,847, 89,113, 89,847). Cars just above a 10,000-mile threshold 
(62,113, 62,847, 82,113, 82,847) showed slight overestimation of mileage.
7  
 
2.2 Application to the used-car market 
We now include this heuristic into a basic framework of competitive retail used-car markets and 
auction-based  wholesale  markets.  We  show  that,  in  such  an  environment,  the  observed  market 
prices of cars with different mileage exhibit the same patterns as the individual-level value function. 
  Consider a market with N consumers interested in purchasing at most one used car; all 
consumers  have the  same  value function  based  on  perceived mileage      given  by Equation 2.
8 
Assume these consumers observe all available used cars in the market at posted prices and purchase 
the car that gives them the highest surplus. There is a competitive retail used-car market with an 
arbitrarily large number of car dealers. These dealers purchase cars at competitive, ascending-bid 
(i.e., English-style), wholesale auctions and resell them to the consumers. There are M cars with 
varying mileage available at the wholesale auctions. Each of these cars has a reserve price of zero.
9 
As long as M ≤ N, there will not be an oversupply of cars and the market will be well-behaved.  
In this environment, the (unique) equilibrium will be characterized by all cars being sold, at a 
price equal to the perceived consumer-value function       . With car dealers driven to zero profits, 
the price of a car at the auction will be equal to the price to the final consumer. If the equilibrium 
price were above        for any arbitrary mileage m, cars of that mileage would not sell and a dealer 
would have an incentive to lower the price. Further, as long as M ≤ N, if the equilibrium retail price 
                                                           
7 The online appendix reports a full description and statistics from the experiment. 
8 We keep with the linear case here only for simplicity. The results do not depend on a linear value function. 
9 This simplifying assumption matches roughly with the behavior of fleet/lease sellers we describe in the next section.  8 
 
were below        for some m, a dealer could set a price above the going market price and make a 
profit, which would violate the zero-profit assumption.  
Although we use a representative-agent framework here, the model can be generalized to 
cases where consumers have heterogeneous demands. If consumers vary in their willingness to pay 
for all cars (i.e., variation in K ), it can be shown that the market prices will reflect the perceived 
value function of the marginal (i.e., M
th highest K) consumer. Similarly, if there is heterogeneity in 
the degree of inattention (i.e., variation in θ) of the final customers, the observed market prices will 





The data for this study come from one of the largest operators of wholesale used-car auctions in the 
United States. The auction process starts when a seller brings a car to the one of the company‟s 89 
auction  facilities  that  hold  auctions  once  or  twice  a  week.  Only  licensed  used-car  dealers  can 
participate. Most sites have between 4 and 7 auction lanes operating simultaneously. Once on the 
auction block, the car dealers bid for cars in a standard oral ascending-price auction that lasts around 
2 minutes per car. The highest bidder receives the car and can take it back to his used-car lot by 
himself or arrange delivery through independent agencies that operate at the auctions. 
  Our dataset contains information about the auction outcome and other details for each car 
brought to auction from January 2002 through September 2008. Table 1 provides summary statistics 
for some of the key variables in the data. The full data set is comprised of just over 27 million cars. 
For each car we observe the make, model, body style, model year, and odometer mileage as well as 
an identifier for the seller of the car. We also observe whether the car sold at auction and the selling 
price. The average car is 4 years old with about 57,000 miles on the odometer. Just over 82% of all 
cars brought to auction sell, with an average price of $10,301.  
Although all of the buyers at the auctions are used-car dealers, there is more diversity in the 
type of sellers. There are two major classes of sellers: car dealers and fleet/lease. A typical dealer sale 
might involve a new-car dealer bringing a car to auction that she received via trade-in and does not 
wish  to  sell  on  her  own  lot.  The  fleet/lease  category  includes  cars  from  rental-car  companies, 
university or corporate fleets, and cars returned to leasing companies at the end of the lease period. 
Table 1 breaks down the key variables by these two major seller categories. About 56% of cars in 
                                                           
10 To get the law of one price to hold, we make the usual assumption that high-value customers purchase first.  9 
 
our dataset come from the dealer category. Dealer cars tend to be a bit older and have higher 
mileage than fleet/lease cars. Possibly due to having better outside options for selling cars, dealer 
cars are less likely to sell at auction; 96% of fleet/lease cars versus 71% of dealer cars. 
A number of details of the market give us confidence that the empirical results below reflect 
responses to car mileage by market participants and are not driven by institutional features of the 
auctions.  First,  the  auction  company‟s  business  model  is  based  on  charging  fees  to  auction 
participants, but these fees are not a direct function of the mileage of the car. Second, cars are not 
sorted into auction lanes or grouped together based on mileage. Finally, and importantly, the used-
car dealers who purchase cars at the auction clearly observe the exact continuous mileage on a car. 
This information is prominently displayed on a large screen that lists information about the car that 
is currently on the block and the dealers can also look into the car to see the odometer. 
 
4. Discontinuity Estimates 
4.1 Graphical analysis   
Raw Prices. We begin the empirical analysis with a simple plot of the raw price data as a function 
of mileage using information on the over 22 million cars that were sold at auctions during our 
sample period. In Figure 2, each dot shows the average sale price for cars in a 500-mile mileage bin, 
starting at 1,000 miles. There is a dot for the average price of cars with 1,000 through 1,499 miles, 
then a dot for cars with 1,500 to 1,999 miles, and so on through 125,000 miles. The vertical lines in 
the  graph  indicate  each  10,000-mile  mark.  As  one  would  expect,  average  prices  decrease  with 
increasing mileage. Within each 10,000-mile band, average prices decline quite smoothly. However, 
there are clear and sizeable discontinuities in average prices at nearly all 10,000-mile marks. 
  With  no  other  explanation  for  the  importance  of  10,000-mile  thresholds,  these  results 
strongly suggest a role for inattention in this  market. Yet although this analysis establishes that 
mileage  thresholds  matter,  estimating  how  much  they  matter  requires  further  investigation.  For 
example, sellers may decide to bring cars to the auction before they cross a mileage threshold. To 
the  extent that this behavior could differ by  seller types or by the  type of car (e.g.,  luxury vs. 
economy),  the  estimated size  of price  discontinuities will  be  biased. As  such,  it is necessary to 
account for these selection issues. 
  Volume. Figure 3 graphs the volume of cars brought to the auction using the full dataset 
and the same 500-mile bins from Figure 2. The first aspect to notice is the presence of peculiar 
patterns in the 30,000 to 50,000 range; as we discuss in more detail below, this pattern is largely 10 
 
driven by dynamics of lease cars. Setting those patterns aside for now, it is clear that there are spikes 
in volume right before the 10,000-mile thresholds at each threshold starting at 60,000 miles. These 
patterns lend further support for the importance of mileage thresholds in the market and suggest 
that at least some sellers of used cars are aware of the inattention-induced price discontinuities. 
However, these results also make it clear that it is necessary to account for selection before obtaining 
estimates of the size of price discontinuities. 
  Residual  Prices.  The  primary  concern  with  interpreting  the  magnitude  of  price 
discontinuities in the graph in Figure 2 is that the cars on either side of the thresholds may differ in 
observable characteristics such as make, model, and age. Other than mileage, these characteristics of 
a car are the primary determinants of prices. In order to account for these differences, we regress the 
price of sold cars on fixed effects for the combination of make (e.g., Honda), model (e.g., Accord), 
body style (e.g., EX Sedan), model year, and auction year. We also include a 7
th-order polynomial in 
mileage to account for continuous patterns of mileage depreciation.
11 We then obtain a residual price 
for each car based on this regression prediction. Figure 4 repeats the graphs in Figure 2 using these 
residuals.
12 This figure is much smoother than Figure 2 since the effect of different car types has 
been netted out. The price discontinuities remain. In fact, they become more uniform (~$150-$200 
each) and are evident at every threshold (although very small at 110,000 miles). 
  Fleet/Lease vs. Dealer. Another area of potentially relevant selection is the seller type. As 
we mentioned in Section 3, there are two distinct categories of sellers in the data: car dealers and 
fleet/lease companies. Recall that fleet/lease companies tend to have somewhat newer cars than do 
the  dealers,  bring cars in  larger lots, and set low reserve  prices.  The  auctions are also typically 
organized  so  that  the  fleet/lease  cars  run  in  separate  lanes  from  those  of  the  dealers.
13  These 
differences suggest that we should conduct our analysis separately for the two seller types. 
Because the low reserve prices used by fleet/lease sellers more closely mirror our theoretical 
discussion in Section 2, we begin with this category and then move to the dealer cars. Figure 5 
repeats the same residual analysis from Figure 4 but now restricts cars to those in the fleet/lease 
                                                           
11 The 7th-order polynomial was chosen based on significance levels in regressions of price on mileage and visual checks 
of predicted values vs. raw data patterns. We have also run more “local” regressions by restricting the sample to various 
subsets (e.g., 25,000 to 35,000 mile cars), which does not require the parametric assumptions to be as strong and find 
nearly identical results. 
12 Rather than plotting the exact residual prices, we add the estimated polynomial in miles and a constant back into the 
residual so that Figure 4 is visually similar to Figure 2. Note that the range of prices in Figure 4 ($7,000 to $14,000) is less 
than that of Figure 2. This is because we are plotting residual prices after removing fixed effects such as age.  
13 Car dealers who bid on cars at the auction can freely and easily move from lane to lane within the auction houses.  11 
 
category.  The  results  are  very  similar  to  those  with  the  full  sample  of  cars,  again  showing 
pronounced discontinuities at the 10,000-mile marks. 
Figure 6 shows the probability of a car selling (Panel A) and the volumes of cars sold (Panel 
B) by mileage for these cars in the fleet/lease category. This figure confirms our discussion from 
Section 3 that the fleet/lease cars are sold with low reservation prices; the probability of selling is 
nearly 1 across most of the mileage range. Furthermore, this probability does not vary around the 
10,000-mile thresholds. The fact that these selling probabilities are very high and smooth through 
the 10,000-mile marks gives us confidence that the inattention-effects that we observe are not driven 
by variations in sale probabilities and that estimates of the price discontinuities can be obtained 
without the complication of considering a two-stage selling process. Looking at the volume patterns 
for fleet/lease cars, we see that this category has a good deal of variation in volume for cars with less 
than 50,000 miles. This reflects institutional features of this segment of the car market. In particular, 
there is a large spike in sales volume around the 36,000-mile mark, due to the prevalence of 3-year 
leases with 12,000-mile-per-year limits.
14 However, the patterns smooth out for higher mileages; in 
particular, there are no volume spikes at the 50,000, 70,000, 80,000, or 90,000 thresholds. Since we 
observe price discontinuities at each of these mileage marks, we are confident that the size of the 
discontinuities in the residual graph (Figure 5) is not biased by selection. 
  Turning to the dealer category, Figure 7 repeats this residual price analysis for dealer-sold 
cars. This graph is almost identical to Figure 5 for the fleet/lease category, showing consistent 
discontinuities of very similar magnitude to those in the fleet/lease category.   Figure  8  shows  the 
probability-of-sale and volume-of-sales patterns for the dealer category. The probability of a sale for 
this category, Panel A, is in the 60% to 70% range, significantly lower than it is for the fleet/lease 
cars. This difference reflects the higher reservation prices used by dealers. The modest upward slope 
of this probability fits with the fact that many of these cars are sold at auction by dealers who 
specialize in new and late-model used cars. For cars with higher mileage, the outside option of these 
dealers likely falls relative to that of the used-car dealers who are buying cars at auction. 
The volume pattern for the dealers is particularly interesting and shows consistent peaks 
right before the 10,000-mile thresholds. This clearly suggests that these mileage thresholds influence 
market behavior. Importantly, however, we find that once we control for the characteristics of the 
car being sold, the pricing patterns by mileage are consistent with those of the fleet/lease category 
                                                           
14 The spike around 48,000 miles likely reflects 4-year/48,000-mile leases whereas the smaller spike around 60,000 could 
be driven in part by 5-year leases.  12 
 
(where these volume spikes do not occur). This consistency fits with our theoretical discussion in 
Section 2. In our model, the distribution of mileage across cars in the used-car market does not 
affect the relative prices of cars with different mileage. Hence, although it is important to account 
for selection on car-type that might be correlated with these volume spikes, these spikes that occur 
before thresholds should not, and do not seem to, affect the estimated discontinuities. 
1,000-Mile Discontinuities. The pricing figures presented thus far allow us to investigate 
whether  discontinuities  also  occur  at  1,000-mile  thresholds.  When  looking  at  the  residual  price 
figures, an interesting pattern emerges: dots in the figures tend to move in pairs. Each dot represents 
a 500-mile mileage bin, and, therefore, pairs of dots represent cars within 1,000 miles. The fact that 
dots move in pairs is evidence, then, of small price discontinuities at 1,000-mile thresholds. To 
illustrate this in more detail, Figure 9 plots the average residual sale price of cars within 50-mile bins 
for all of the cars in our dataset. Since the data can become noisy when looking within 50-mile bins, 
we pool the data so that each dot represents the average residual for a bin that is a given distance 
from the nearest threshold. For example, the first dot in the figure represents the average residual 
value of all cars whose mileage falls between 10,000-10,050, 20,000-20,050, …, on through 110,000-
110,050. In this way, all of the data can be condensed into a 10,000-mile range. The figure clearly 
demonstrates breaks that occur at several of the 1,000-mile thresholds. The two largest of these 
breaks occur at the 5,000- and 9,000-mile marks. Regression analysis indicates that the value of a car 
drops, on average, by approximately $20 as it passes over a 1,000-mile threshold. 
 
4.2 Regression analysis 
Having established the existence of consistent price discontinuities at 10,000-mile thresholds using 
this largely  non-parametric approach, we turn now  to regression  analysis to establish numerical 
estimates  of  the  price  discontinuities.  Throughout,  we  run  our  regressions  separately  for  the 
fleet/lease and dealer categories.
15 Motivated by the literature on regression discontinuity designs 
(see Lee and Lemieux, 2009 for an overview), we employ the following regression specification:  
                                                                        
                              (4) 
                                                           
15 While the graphical analysis used all of the data in our sample, our regression analyses only use a 20% random sample 
of data from each year due to computing constraints.  13 
 
The dependent variable in our primary regression is the sale price for cars that sold at an auction.
16 
The function f(milesi) is a flexible function of mileage intended to capture smooth patterns in how 
cars depreciate with mileage. The regression also includes a series of indicator variables (expressed 
with Ds in the equation above) for whether mileage has crossed a given threshold. We are interested 
in  the  βj  coefficients,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  the  discontinuous  changes  in  price  (all  else 
constant) that occur as cars cross a particular 10,000-mile threshold. In this way, the specification 
allows us to estimate the price discontinuities separately at each 10,000-mile threshold. Finally, Xi 
includes characteristics of the particular car being sold (make, model, etc.). 
  Table 2 presents the regression results for the fleet/lease cars. The first column controls only 
for a 7
th-order polynomial in mileage and the mileage-threshold indicators and provides estimates of 
the price discontinuities before any corrections for selection on observables. Given the size of our 
dataset, the coefficients are generally highly statistically significant. The majority of the coefficient 
estimates  are  negative,  which  is  consistent  with  our  theory  of  inattention.  However,  they  vary 
substantially, and a few (e.g., at 30,000 miles) are even significantly positive. Columns 2 through 7 in 
the table add increasingly restrictive fixed effects to the model. Column 2 adds a control for the age 
of the car and all but one of the coefficient estimates become negative. Columns 3, 4, and 5 report 
estimates after adding make, model, and body of the car, respectively, to the fixed effects. Thus, by 
Column 5, identification of the model is coming from observing different mileages of cars of the 
same make, model, body style, and age. In fact, the regression in Column 5 estimates the threshold 
discontinuities that we observed in Figure 5. Once these controls are included in the model, all of 
the  coefficient  estimates  are  negative,  and  all  but  one  is  highly  statistically  significant.  The 
coefficients are similar across thresholds with an un-weighted average across thresholds of -$157. 
While the results in Column 5 control for both the type of car and the car‟s age, which likely 
captures most of the selection that would affect market prices, we strengthen the controls further in 
Column 6 by adding a control for auction location to the fixed effect and in Column 7 by adding a 
control for seller identifier. Thus, the identification of the parameter estimates in Column 7 comes 
from the same seller selling identical types of cars that differ in mileage at the same auction.
17 These 
controls do not change the coefficient estimates meaningfully, and the stability of the estimates from 
                                                           
16 We have also run regressions with log(price) as the dependent variable. While the results are all qualitatively similar, 
the goodness of fit is somewhat worse with logs than with levels. 
17 Of course, while the identification is driven by variation in mileage for a given car from a given seller, the size of the 
discontinuities at different mileage thresholds will be affected by a different mix of cars. That is, since the variation in 
mileage for a given car of a given age is sizeable but not huge, it is unlikely that any one car/seller combination could be 
used to tightly identify threshold discontinuities across the entire range that we analyze.  14 
 
Columns 4 through 7 suggests that controlling for the model and age of the car accounts for most of 
the relevant selection. 
Table 3 presents the same analysis for the dealer category. In Column 1, before controls are 
included, the estimates of price discontinuities at the 10,000-mile thresholds are all negative and 
generally  very  large.  Once  controls  are  included,  however,  the  estimated  discontinuities  for  the 
dealer cars are very close to those obtained for the fleet/lease cars. In fact, if we compare the un-
weighted average of discontinuity estimates in Column 5 for these categories, we see that it is $173 
for dealer cars and $157 for fleet/lease cars. Increasing the controls by including auction location 
and seller fixed effects does not meaningfully affect the results. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks and alternative explanations 
In this section, we address a number of alternative explanations and factors that might affect our 
findings and that the econometric specification developed above would not fully control for. 
  Differences across  Time.  The  estimates presented  in  Tables 2 and 3  come  from data 
pooled across all of the years in our sample. We also ran regressions cutting the data by the different 
years and present these results in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. Average discontinuities in each year 
range from $134 to $170 for fleet/lease cars and from $160 to $180 for dealer cars. As a percentage 
of the average price per year, the discontinuities are quite stable over time, ranging between 1.6% 
and 1.2%, though this percentage is slightly lower in the last two years of the data.  
Heterogeneity across Car Models. We have also run regressions separately for the 8 most 
popular cars in our data in terms of volume sold. Although there is heterogeneity in the average 
discontinuity price across these  car makes (which we  discuss further below), we find  large and 
significant discontinuities for each of the car types. These results are available in Appendix Table 3. 
  Selection  on  Unobservables.  The  regression  analyses  in  Section  4.2  yield  very  stable 
estimates of significant price discontinuities at the mileage thresholds that, we believe, account for 
the impacts of selection on the size of discontinuities. Nonetheless, it is worth asking whether there 
are sources of unobserved heterogeneity around the mileage thresholds that may cause bias. There 
are a number of reasons to feel confident that this is not the case. First, selection on unobservables 
may not be such a large concern in this setting since market prices can only be influenced by factors 
that  are  observable  to  participants  at  the  auctions,  and  our  data  capture  most  of  the  relevant 
information. Second, the similarity of the estimates obtained for the two different seller categories 
gives us confidence in the estimates. This is especially convincing given that at many of the 10,000-15 
 
mile thresholds there is no apparent selection for the fleet/lease vehicles. Third, one of the reasons 
we are concerned about selection is that we observe volume spikes for the dealer cars around the 
thresholds.  However,  notice  that,  although  volume  spikes  and  dives  right  before  and  after  the 
thresholds,  it  is  relatively  stable  elsewhere.  This  might  make  us  worry  that  selection  is  heavily 
influencing average prices right around the thresholds. Yet in Figures 4, 5, and 7, we see that the 
discontinuities are not driven solely by points right around the thresholds; the entire price schedule 
shifts down after each threshold. Finally, it is worth considering the nature of the selection effects 
that are revealed through our regression analysis. In the dealer category, the effects of selection seem 
to bias the estimates in a uniform way; all of the coefficients in the first column are strongly negative 
and become smaller, in absolute value, once selection is accounted for. Despite the stability of the 
estimates across increasing controls, one might be concerned that some bias still exists. However, 
for the fleet/lease category, the changes in the coefficient estimates as we add controls do not 
change in a systematic direction. Some of the estimated discontinuities become less negative, but 
others started out positive and then became negative in other specifications. These patterns, when 
coupled with the consistency of the estimates across the seller categories, give us confidence in the 
discontinuity estimates. 
Warranties. Another important concern on our findings is the possibility that expiring new-
car warranties may produce price discontinuities at 10,000-mile thresholds. It is first worth noting 
that warranties would not necessarily cause a discontinuous drop in price. The value of a warranty 
likely diminishes at a smooth rate as a car approaches the warranty threshold. However, it is possible 
that, when adverse selection is a concern, having a warranty with even just a few hundred miles left 
could give a discontinuous increase to the value of a car because it could defray the possible cost of 
purchasing a car that is soon revealed to be a lemon. We gathered information about warranties 
during our sample period for the largest car brands (Chevrolet, Ford, Toyota, Nissan, and Honda). 
Across these makes, some type of warranty existed at the 36k, 50k, 60k, and 100k mile marks. 
Importantly, there were no warranties at the 10k, 20k, 30k, 40k, 70k, 80k, 90k, and 120k mile marks, 
where we find significant discontinuities. This and the fact that we do not observe a significant 
discontinuity at 36,000 miles suggest that our results are not being driven by warranties. Further, 
warranties clearly cannot explain discontinuities at 1,000-mile marks. 
Published Price Information. In the U.S., there are a number of sources of information 
that potential customers could investigate in order to form their expectations of the price of a used 
car. The leading providers of such information are Kelly Blue Book and Edmunds.com, which both 16 
 
offer information on average retail-level, used-car sale prices. If the data that these firms provide 
strongly  influences  purchasing  behavior,  then  how  they  present  information  could  conceivably 
influence market prices. We collected data on a number of cars from both the Kelley Blue Book and 
Edmunds websites for a range of mileage. Some discontinuities are present in the price data from 
the Kelley Blue Book, but they do not occur consistently at the 10,000 mile marks. In the case of 
Edmunds.com, a smoothing algorithm is used that would lead consumers to expect price schedules 
that have no discontinuities by mileage at all. 
Odometer Tampering.  The actual mileage on a car may be different than the mileage 
indicated by the odometer if cheating is occurring in the market. For example, some sellers might 
anticipate 10,000-mile discontinuities and manipulate the odometer so as to report a mileage below a 
threshold. Though we find no evidence of odometer tampering in our data – for example, cars right 
before 10,000-mile thresholds are not older than expected – this phenomenon could potentially 
explain  some  of  the  volume  patterns  observed  in  the  data.  Notice,  however,  that  odometer 
tampering would likely bias down the estimates that we find if buyers were aware that some cars 
before a threshold had more miles on them than the odometers indicated. 
Canadian Data. According to our framework, price discontinuities are a result of consumer 
inattention when processing numbers. Therefore, none of the results should depend on the unit of 
measure in which the numbers are reported. We have a smaller set of data for auctions that the 
company  ran  in  Canada  (N=289,055),  where  odometers  report  kilometers  rather  than  miles, 
between 2002 and 2005. In regressions analyses, 8 out of 12 of the coefficients on the 10,000-
kilometer  dummy  variables  are  negative  and  statistically  significant.  The  average  size  of  the 
discontinuities is -CAN$184, which is comparable to results with U.S. data.
18 
 
5. Estimating the Inattention Parameter 
In this section we generate estimates of the inattention parameter () from our model in Section 2. 
To clarify the logic of this estimation, we first present linear approximations (Section 5.1) and then 
turn to the structural estimates (Section 5.2). 
 
 
                                                           
18 As a placebo test, we also include dummy variables for 10,000-mile thresholds (by converting kilometer values to 
miles) in the regressions. None of the 10,000-mile threshold dummies are significant at conventional levels. Further 
details and figures from this additional analysis are available in the online appendix. 17 
 
5.1 Linear approximations 
Recall from Section 2 (and Figure 1) that, for the simple linear case, the size of the estimated price 
discontinuity at a 10,000-mile threshold should be approximately equal to         , where   is the 
slope of the value function with respect to actual miles (true depreciation). This slope ( ) can be 
observed by drawing a line through the value function at the 10,000-mile thresholds. In the residual 
graphs in Figures 5 and 7, one can obtain an estimate of   by drawing lines between the dots 
centered on the threshold points. For the fleet/lease category, the average slope across these points 
is -0.047 and for the dealer cars it is -0.060. Using the average discontinuity estimates discussed 
above  yields  an  estimate  of  θ  equal  to 
   
                     for  the  fleet/lease  estimation  and 
   
                    for the dealer estimation. 
For the linear case, the inattention parameter has a natural interpretation in our setting. 
From Equations (1) and (2), the overall decrease in a car‟s value between any two given 10,000-mile 
intervals is given by          The discontinuity at a 10,000-mile mark is           Therefore, the 
value of θ gives the fraction of the reduction of value across mileage that occurs at 10,000-mile 
thresholds. As such, the results here suggest that approximately 30% of the depreciation that a car 
experiences due to mileage increases occurs discontinuously at 10,000-mile thresholds. 
  In  Section  4.3,  we  mentioned  that  there  is  heterogeneity  in  the  size  of  the  price 
discontinuities across car types. Our model of inattention predicts this heterogeneity. As noted in 
Section 2, under a constant level of inattention, cars that depreciate at a faster rate (i.e., have a large 
 ) should have larger discontinuities. The intuition is as follows. Imagine an extreme case of a car 
type that depreciates by almost nothing between 20,000 and 30,000 miles. The perceived value that 
an inattentive buyer will place on this car type when it has 29,999 miles will not be very different 
than at 30,000 miles. By contrast, a car that depreciates very steeply will result in an inattentive buyer 
placing very large differences in value around a 10,000-mile threshold. To test this prediction, we 
estimate  the  average  10,000-mile  price  discontinuity  for  each  of  the  250 most  popular  (highest 
volume sold) car models in our dataset. We also estimate the linear   parameter of depreciation 
separately for each of these models. We find significant heterogeneity in depreciation rates across car 
types. For example, the cars that depreciated fastest included BMW series, Mercedes Benz classes, 
Chevy Corvette, Jaguar, and the Hummer H2, as opposed to such vehicles as Honda Accord, Ford 
Escort, and Hyundai Accent that had lower depreciation rates. Figure 10 reports a scatter plot of the 
depreciation rate ( ) and the average 10,000-mile discontinuity for the 250 car types. We find a 18 
 
significant positive correlation between depreciation rate and threshold discontinuities (p <.001). 
This graph also provides a second way of estimating the size of the inattention parameter θ. The 
model predicts that the points in this scatter plot should lie along a ray from the origin with a slope 
equal to θ. The linear fit through this scatter plot has an intercept that is not statistically different 
from zero and an estimate of θ (the slope) of 0.3, which is nearly identical to the estimates above.
19 
 
5.2 Structural estimation of the inattention parameter 
We now turn to a direct estimation of the inattention parameter based on the structural specification 
of our model, as from  Equation 2 in Section 2.  Again we allow for non-linear depreciation in 
mileage by having a car‟s value depend on a 7
th-order polynomial in perceived mileage (    :  
                                                                    
 
                    (5) 
The perceived mileage can be rewritten as (        , where again  is the inattention parameter, m 
is the car‟s true mileage and mr is the “mileage remainder” after subtracting off the mileage based on 
the left-most digit. For example, for m = 12,345, this mileage remainder would be 2,345. Therefore 
Equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
                                                                    
                                             (6) 
We use non-linear least squares estimation to obtain estimates of the parameters in Equation 6. 
Because it is difficult to account for car-specific factors using fixed effects in non-linear least-squares 
estimation, we use a two step procedure to obtain these estimates. First, we obtain estimates for the 
car-specific valuations (K) for each car by running regression specifications as in Section 4, where the 
estimates of K come from the fixed effects. We subtract these estimates of K from the sale price to 
form a residual that nets out the car-specific valuation, just as in Figures 4, 5 and 7. We then 
perform non-linear least squares regressions of that residual on the 7
th-order polynomial of (   
    , which give us estimates of the seven  parameters and of . As the discussion of the model 
in Section 2 and Section 5.1 both highlight,  is identified by the discontinuities in prices around 
mileage thresholds and their interaction with the depreciation ( parameters) at that point. 
   For the full sample of cars (both fleet/lease and dealer categories) using fixed effects that are 
a combination of make, model, body-style and age (as in Column 5 of Tables 2 and 3), we estimate  
to  be  0.31  with  a  standard  error  of  0.01.  This  corresponds  almost  exactly  to  the  linear 
approximations above. For each of the regression specifications reported in Tables 2 and 3, we 
                                                           
19 This estimate is robust to the exclusion of outliers in the scatter plot. 19 
 
include the estimated  value and standard error corresponding to that specification. These estimates 
for  the  fleet/lease  category  in  Table  2  show  an  estimated    ranging  from  0.20  to  0.25  across 
different specifications, with a value of 0.24 to 0.25 in the benchmark specifications in Column 5 
and 6. We estimate a greater degree of inattention for cars in the dealer category, with estimates of 
0.37 and 0.32 in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, respectively.  
  Comparing the inattention estimates for fleet/lease versus dealer cars more closely reveals 
that there is a relationship between mileage and inattention in the used-car market. Recall that the 
estimates  in  Column  6  of  Tables  2  and  3  show  essentially  the  same  un-weighted  average 
discontinuity at 10,000 mile marks for the dealer and fleet/lease categories. That would suggest very 
similar patterns of inattention for both groups.
20 Yet, the inattention parameter is higher for dealer 
cars than for fleet/lease cars. The reason for this is that the dealer cars have higher mileage than the 
fleet/lease cars and it turns out that inattention is higher for higher mileage cars. The  estimates are 
based on the range of cars for each sample and the higher estimate for the dealer cars reflects that 
the  for that category is identified off of transactions of more high mileage cars. If we split the 
samples of both categories at the 50,000-mile mark we find that above 50,000 miles the estimate for 
 is 0.33 for fleet/lease cars and 0.39 for dealer cars and below 50,000 miles it is 0.19 for fleet/lease 
and 0.24 for dealer cars. We return to this relationship between mileage and inattention in the 
discussion of rational inattention in our concluding section. 
  We  can  also  explore  the  extent  to  which  people  display  increasing  inattention  to  digits 
further to the right. Equation 3 in Section 2 showed that this could be captured with separate 
inattention parameters for each digit to the right of the left-most. For example, with inattention to 
the second digit (1) and further inattention beyond the second digit (2), mileage of 49,999 would 
be  perceived  as                                                       If  2  =  0,  the  person 
shows the same level of partial attention to all digits past the first; as 2 approaches 1, the person 
comes closer to completely ignoring further digits. The discontinuities at 1,000-mile marks allow us 
to identify 2. In the linear case, the 1,000-mile discontinuities are equal to 2(1-1)1,000, so there 
will only be 1,000-mile-mark discontinuities if 2  0. We include the specification for perceived 
mileage with 2 into our non-linear least squares estimation. This estimation over the entire sample 
(pooling fleet/lease and dealer categories) yields an estimate of 1 = 0.31 (s.e.=0.01) and 2 = 0.43 
                                                           
20 In fact, the linear approximation, based on this unweighted average, finds very similar  values that are slightly higher 
for the fleet/lease category.  20 
 
(s.e.=0.04).  With  a  linear  depreciation  rate  ()  of  0.05,  these  estimates  predict  1,000-mile 
discontinuities  of  approximately  $15,  which  is  in  line  with  the  averages  reported  above.  These 
estimates suggest that attention continues to decrease after the second digit.  
 
6. Understanding the incidence of the bias 
Because our data come from the wholesale market, a natural question is: Who is inattentive? Do the 
observed patterns reflect inattention on the part of final customers or rather the inattention of the 
dealers themselves? Like our theoretical framework in Section 2, most work in “behavioral industrial 
organization”  starts  from  the  premise  that  rational  firms  operate  with  an  awareness  of  (and 
sometimes the ability to exploit) the biases of customers. Part of the motivation for that benchmark 
is that previous studies have shown that biases may be attenuated when agents accumulate market 
experience (List, 2003). On the other hand, there is evidence that auction settings may exacerbate 
biases,  since  it  will  often  be  the  most  biased  agents  who  win  auctions  (Lee  and  Malmendier, 
forthcoming; Malmendier and Szeidl, 2008). This raises the possibility that the inattention to mileage 
in  this market could stem from the  professional  dealers purchasing at auction.  Parsing out the 
incidence of bias in this market is challenging because if the end customers display inattention, it will 
be difficult to distinguish between a savvy used-car dealer who purchases cars with an awareness of 
this bias and an un-savvy used-car dealer who happens to share the same bias as his end customers. 
In this section we present a range of cuts designed to investigate whether the price discontinuities 
seem to be driven primarily by used-car dealers or final customers.  
A starting point for this analysis is to look for evidence of these types of discontinuity 
patterns in the car market outside of wholesale auctions. We collected limited volume data from 
Cars.com, a leading automotive-classifieds website targeted to final customers.
21 These data reveal 
the presence of similar volume spikes at mileages just before the 10,000-mile thresholds. While these 
date  lack  information  on  ultimate  sale  prices,  these  patterns  are  at  least  suggestive  that  the 
inattention effects we observe in our data are not simply a wholesale-auction phenomenon. 
Within  our  data,  one  approach  to  investigating  the  incidence  of  bias  is  to  exploit  the 
variation in auction experience of the used-car dealers at the auction. Consider the possibility that 
the used-car dealers, but not the final customers, are inattentive. This would imply that cars with 
mileage just below a threshold are overpriced at the auction relative to what they can be sold for in 
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the retail market. In this case, we might expect that more experienced dealers would have learned to 
avoid the costly bias and would be more likely to purchase cars just above 10,000-mile thresholds. 
Hence, we would expect the fraction of cars purchased by experienced buyers to jump up at the 
10,000-mile thresholds. On the other hand, assume that the bias is driven by the final customers. If 
some of the inexperienced car dealers are unaware of inattention effects, they will wrongly believe 
that prices will be smooth across mileage thresholds. In this case, they will perceive cars before 
thresholds to be overpriced relative to those past the thresholds and could be expected to cluster 
more  on  the  post-threshold  cars.  Hence,  we  would  expect  the  share  of  cars  purchased  by 
experienced dealers to fall at the thresholds. 
We investigate these experience patterns in Figure 11. For each 500-mile bin, we report the 
average “experience level” of the buyers of cars in that bin. For each year of our data, we obtain an 
experience measure by calculating the total number of cars each dealer in our data purchased at the 
auctions in that year.
22 We then give each dealer an experience-percentile rating, which is 0 for the 
least experienced and 100 for the most experienced buyers, in the data. Figure 11 illustrates that 
crossing a 10,000-mile threshold leads to a small discontinuous drop in the average experience level 
of car buyers. The experienced buyers at the auction are more likely to purchase the higher-priced 
cars with mileage just before a salient threshold. This evidence, then, supports the idea that the price 
discontinuities are primarily driven by inattention of final customers and that inexperienced used-car 
dealers may be somewhat less aware of this bias.  
A second approach using our data is given by two empirical tests related to the potential 
presence of some used-car dealers who are unaware of the extent of the left-digit bias. First, if this is 
true,  then  observed  auction  prices  will  slightly  understate  the  degree  of  inattention  by  final 
customers  and  we  should  observe  smaller  average  price  discontinuities  at  10,000-mile  marks  at 
auctions where there are fewer experienced dealers. We repeated our primary regression analysis 
splitting the sample into quartiles based on average dealer experience (measured as in Figure 11) at 
the auction. We find that the size of the discontinuities is positively related to the average experience 
of the buyers at the auction.
23 Further, if it is a subset of biased car dealers purchasing at auction 
who drive the inattention results and not the final customers, then we would expect that, because 
this auction setting is strategically equivalent to a second-price auction, there is more likely to be one 
                                                           
22 This result is robust to other measures of experience.  
23 The un-weighted average discontinuity for the lowest (highest) quartile of experience is $135 ($190) for dealer cars and 
$143 ($173) for fleet/lease cars. These results are available from the authors on request.  22 
 
of these biased agents bidding on a car when the market is “thicker”, and price discontinuities 
should be larger.
24 To investigate this issue, we replicated our regression analysis splitting the sample 
into the top and bottom quartile of auction “thickness” defined as the number of cars auctioned that 
day, the number of unique buyers at the auction, and the ratio of unique buyers to cars.
25 The first 
two measures are highly correlated and both cuts reveal slightly higher average discontinuities on 
busy auction days. However, the differences are small and we find no gradient when we cut by 
quartiles of thickness as defined as the ratio of unique buyers to cars.
26 
Another approach to identifying the incidence of the bias is to look at cars that are very close 
to passing over a threshold. Since the used-car dealer often drives the car back to his/her lot after 
the auction and since customers can test drive a vehicle, a car that is within a few miles of a 10,000-
mile threshold may pass over the threshold prior to being sold to a final customer.
27 Thus, if dealers 
are savvy, we would expect car values to drop several miles before a 10,000-mile threshold rather 
than dropping precipitously at the exact 10,000-mile marks. Figure 9 provides evidence that car 
values do drop significantly prior to reaching a 10,000-mile threshold. The last dot in Figure 9 is the 
value of cars that are within 50 miles of a 10,000-mile threshold. This dot illustrates that the average 
value of a car that is within 50 miles of a threshold drops by ~$60. Although not conclusive, this is 
again suggestive evidence that dealers are somewhat savvy and that it is the final customers who are 
inattentive to mileage. Note, however, that prices do not fully drop before the threshold, which 
leaves open the possibility of some degree of inattention by buyers at the auction.  
  A final question is whether sellers at the auctions appear to be aware of these inattention 
effects. There is little evidence that the fleet/lease sellers adjust their behavior to these threshold 
effects because they uniformly set low reserve prices and do not show systematic volume spikes 
around the thresholds. The volume patterns for dealer cars, however, clearly suggest that some of 
these sellers are aware of the threshold effects.
 Since many of the cars that dealers sell at auctions 
come from trade-ins on their lots, these volume patterns could, however, be driven by individuals 
who decide to trade in their cars (perhaps quite rationally) before the thresholds. The probability 
graphs for the different seller types, however, also provide some hints that some of the dealers who 
sell cars at the auctions may be unaware of the threshold effects. Recall that the probability graphs 
                                                           
24 This test was suggested by the work of Malmendier and Szeidl (2008), who discuss the possibility that auction settings 
are a place for sellers to “fish for fools”.  
25 This analysis was done splitting by quartiles within auction location.  
26 These results are available from the authors on request.  
27 Our discussions with used-car dealers suggest they are aware of these discontinuities. One dealer explained that while 
salespeople can drive cars from the lot, everyone is instructed to avoid driving a car over a 10,000-mile threshold.  23 
 
for the fleet/lease cars are uniformly high and smooth through the thresholds, revealing that there is 
no systematic drop in demand for cars at the thresholds in the auctions. Yet a close look at the 
probability graphs for the dealer category shows that there seem to be slight drops in the probability 
of dealer cars selling at the  thresholds. This could be consistent with some dealer sellers being 
unaware of the inattention of final used-car customers. Since the dealers set reservation prices that 
are at times binding, if some fraction of these sellers are unaware of threshold effects, they may fail 
to adjust their reserve prices downward enough at thresholds. This in turn could lead to drops in the 
probability  of  sales  for  these  dealers  at  the  thresholds.  We  have  run  regression  results  on  the 
probability of sale using the above-mentioned framework and find some suggestive evidence of 
drops in probability of sale at 10,000-mile marks for the dealer sellers.
28 However, the results are 
weak at many thresholds and are suggestive at best.  
  Taken together, these results are consistent with a view that the incidence of bias in this 
market likely rests primarily with the final customers, but that there may also be some degree of 
heterogeneity in the awareness of that bias on the part of the professional suppliers in the market.  
 
7. Discussion 
We  find  strong  evidence for the  hypothesis that partial  inattention  to mileage has a significant 
impact  on  the  used-car  market.  Without  a  model  of  inattention,  it  would  be  difficult  to  even 
understand some of the basic descriptive statistics regarding the prices and quantities of cars sold. 
Because of the size of the car market, this simple heuristic leads to a large amount of mispricing. 
Our estimates of the difference between observed selling prices and the prices that we would expect 
under full attention suggest that there was approximately $2.4 billion worth of mispricing due to 
inattention in our full dataset. Additionally, the supply decisions of hundreds of thousands of cars 
were affected by this heuristic (e.g., sold right before a 10,000-mile threshold). Although it is likely 
that  these  distortions  largely  result  in  transfers  between  market  participants  rather  than  large 
economic inefficiencies, it is striking that this simple heuristic can so profoundly shape the nature of 
a reasonably competitive, high-value durable-goods market.  
  We anticipate that the left-digit bias could be widespread. More generally, heuristic numeric 
processing might impact a range of other settings, in particular environments where inferences are 
made based on continuous quality metrics. Examples include hiring or admissions decisions based 
                                                           
28 The results of these regressions are available upon request.  24 
 
on GPAs and test scores, the evaluation of companies based on financial reports (e.g., revenues), the 
treatment of medical test results, and how the public reacts to government spending programs.  
  There remains a question of whether this inattention should be thought of as an irrational 
bias or a (boundedly) rational calculation in the face of mental processing constraints. The answer 
likely depends on how broadly one considers the question of the appropriateness of the heuristic. In 
general  the  left-digit  bias  is  likely  a  reasonable  heuristic  in  the  face  of  cognitive  processing 
constraints.  However,  in  this  setting  the  ex-ante  costs  of  inattention  relative  to  a  full-attention 
benchmark are on the order of $75 and anyone purchasing a car near a threshold will very quickly 
see a drop in value of approximately $150. Given that mileage information is easy to obtain, it seems 
unlikely, then, that the heuristic corresponds with a rational expected cost-benefit analysis narrowly 
within this market. Perhaps a more relevant question than whether heuristics are boundedly rational 
in absolute terms is whether people employ heuristics more when they are more appropriate. Our 
evidence on that issue is somewhat mixed. On one hand, we observe that the estimates of the 
inattention  parameter  are  higher  for  higher  mileage  cars.  Given  that  marginal  mileage  is  more 
important for low-mileage cars than for high-mileage cars, this result would be consistent with a 
bounded-rationality interpretation that buyers rely more on the left-digit heuristics in settings where 
it is less costly to do so. On the other hand, when we look across car types, comparing those that 
depreciate more quickly versus those that depreciate more slowly, we find relatively similar levels of 
attention, which would suggest that the heuristic is not being deployed “optimally”. Englmaier and 
Schmoller (2008) explore closely related issues of inattention in an online gaming market and find 
that even when relevant information becomes more salient and available, participants still do not pay 
full attention to it, which also suggests that the application of information processing heuristics do 
not always respond strongly to the environment. Ultimately, it seems to us that the use of limited 
attention heuristics, such as the left-digit bias, is a generally sensible human tendency, but one that 
does not always fit with modern economic settings. One direction for future research, then, is to 
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Figure 1.  Example Value Function 
This figure provides an example of how the consumer’s value function from Eq 2 in Section 2 would look 
with a positive value of θ. 
 
 
Discontinuity = αθ10,000  Slope = -α(1-θ)  Slope = -α 
Value 
       
     































































Miles on Car (Rounded Down to Nearest 500)Figure 4 - Price Residuals.  This figure plots the average residual sales price within 500-mile bins for the more than 22 million auctioned cars in our 






































Miles on Car (Rounded Down to Nearest 500)Figure 5 - Fleet/Lease Price Residuals.  This figure plots the average residual sales price within 500-mile bins for the cars in our dataset sold by 






































Miles on Car (Rounded Down to Nearest 500)Panel A - Fraction Sold
Panel B - Volume
Figure 6 - Fleet/Lease Fraction Sold and Volume.  Panel A plots the fraction of fleet/lease cars within 
500-mile bins that sold.  Panel B plots the raw counts within 500 mile bins for the fleet/lease cars in 
































































Miles on Car (Rounded Down to Nearest 500)Figure 7 - Dealer Price Residuals.  This figure plots the average residual sales price within 500-mile bins for the cars in our dataset sold by Dealers. 






































Miles on Car (Rounded Down to Nearest 500)Panel A - Fraction Sold
Panel B - Volume
Figure 8 - Dealer Fraction Sold and Volume.  Panel A plots the fraction of dealer cars within 500-mile 
































































Miles on Car (Rounded Down to Nearest 500)Figure 9 - 1,000-Mile Discontinuities.  This figure plots the average residual sales price within 50-mile bins for all cars in our dataset.  To 
decrease noise, the data were stacked so that each dot is the average residual for cars in the same bin relative to a 10,000-mile threshold.  For 
example, the very first dot represents the average residual value of all cars whose mileage falls between 10,000-10,050, 20,000-20,050, 30,000-








































Miles on Car Relative to 10,000-Mile Threshold (Rounded Down to Nearest 50)Figure 10 - Depreciation and Discontinuity Correlation.  This figure plots the depreciation rate (alpha) and the average 10,000-mile price 





























































Rate of Car Depreciation across Miles (Alpha)Figure 11 - Experience Percentile.  Each buyer in the dataset is given a experience percentile rating based on total volume of purchases (the 1% of 












































Miles on Car (Rounded Down to Nearest 500)2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 All Years
All Cars
Cars brought to auction 4,201,337 3,946,544 4,013,990 3,922,811 3,857,324 3,956,676 3,103,236 27,001,918
Cars sold at auction 3,465,958 3,324,874 3,276,768 3,226,587 3,132,033 3,238,287 2,531,154 22,195,661
Price Sold $9,861 $9,396 $9,862 $10,421 $10,789 $11,141 $10,832 $10,301
Mileage 54,634 56,528 58,028 58,764 57,926 57,384 55,620 56,997
Model Year 1998.1 1999.0 1999.9 2000.8 2001.9 2002.9 2003.9 2000.8
Dealer Cars
Cars brought to auction 2,010,481 2,060,560 2,318,420 2,406,979 2,384,672 2,313,739 1,604,615 15,099,466
Cars sold at auction 1,357,210 1,449,774 1,639,840 1,773,045 1,738,082 1,686,121 1,132,102 10,776,174
Price Sold $8,493 $8,543 $9,144 $9,712 $9,867 $10,046 $9,270 $9,346
Mileage 65,269 65,473 65,327 65,710 66,242 67,582 68,128 66,197
Model Year 1996.8 1997.9 1999.0 2000.0 2000.9 2001.8 2002.6 1999.9
Fleet/Lease Cars
Cars brought to auction 2,190,856 1,885,984 1,695,570 1,515,832 1,472,652 1,642,937 1,498,621 11,902,452
Cars sold at auction 2,108,748 1,875,100 1,636,928 1,453,542 1,393,951 1,552,166 1,399,052 11,419,487
Price Sold $10,742 $10,055 $10,582 $11,287 $11,938 $12,329 $12,096 $11,203
Mileage 47,789 49,611 50,716 50,291 47,557 46,306 45,499 48,316
Model Year 1999.0 1999.9 2000.8 2001.9 2003.0 2004.2 2005.1 2001.7
Table 1.  Summary Statistics(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Avg. Discontinuity Size -131.8 -164.1 -141.9 -154.5 -156.8 -161.6 -168.8
Estimated Theta 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.22
[.01] [.01] [.01] [.01] [.01] [.01] [.01]
MT 10k miles -22.2 -81.6 -151.2*** -45.9* -56.1** -41.1* -56.6**
[73.8] [73.1] [52.6] [27.3] [22.4] [23.1] [26.9]
MT 20k miles -191.2*** -190.2*** -113.4*** -149.6*** -157.8*** -158.5*** -135.8***
[40.1] [39.7] [28.0] [14.1] [11.6] [12.1] [14.1]
MT 30k miles 218.2*** 63.1** 45.5** -94.5*** -84.7*** -101.7*** -101.0***
[26.1] [25.8] [17.9] [9.3] [7.8] [8.2] [10.0]
MT 40k miles -87.4*** -83.7*** -122.9*** -160.7*** -181.9*** -175.8*** -181.1***
[29.3] [28.9] [19.6] [10.2] [8.7] [9.1] [11.2]
MT 50k miles -653.2*** -574.8*** -312.5*** -268.9*** -289.3*** -305.6*** -317.9***
[29.9] [29.1] [20.0] [10.9] [9.4] [10.0] [13.3]
MT 60k miles -416.8*** -450.2*** -291.6*** -226.0*** -207.0*** -211.3*** -201.3***
[31.6] [30.6] [21.8] [12.4] [11.0] [11.5] [16.1]
MT 70k miles 111.4*** 27.4 -125.6*** -212.6*** -215.6*** -214.0*** -213.6***
[31.5] [30.2] [22.3] [13.2] [11.8] [12.4] [18.6]
MT 80k miles -4.3 -19.6 -133.6*** -213.7*** -216.6*** -216.0*** -210.8***
[31.5] [29.7] [23.0] [14.4] [13.1] [14.2] [22.9]
MT 90k miles -284.7*** -245.8*** -205.2*** -185.4*** -185.8*** -211.8*** -241.9***
[34.7] [32.4] [25.5] [16.2] [14.8] [16.3] [27.0]
MT 100k miles -305.9*** -347.8*** -266.7*** -167.2*** -154.0*** -160.5*** -174.2***
[34.1] [31.3] [25.7] [17.3] [16.1] [18.5] [32.1]
MT 110k miles 153.5*** 67.2* 6.8 -5.2 -3 11.1 15.2
[40.9] [37.8] [30.9] [20.2] [18.6] [22.8] [40.6]
MT 120k miles -98.4* -133.7*** -32.3 -123.9*** -129.5*** -153.6*** -206.6***
[54.3] [48.9] [40.9] [28.1] [26.3] [34.3] [63.5]













R-Squared 0.224 0.257 0.632 0.895 0.926 0.960 0.974
Observations 2,337,851 2,337,851 2,337,851 2,337,851 2,337,851 2,337,851 2,337,851
** p < .05;  *** p < .01
Table 2.  The Impact of 10,000-Miles-Driven Discontinuities on Price - Fleet/Lease Only
Dependent Variable: Auction Price for Car Sale(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Avg. Discontinuity Size -446.0 -376.3 -264.0 -180.5 -173.2 -167.3 -146.4
Estimated Theta 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.24
[.01] [.01] [.01] [.01] [.01] [.01] [.01]
MT 10k miles -801.7*** -691.6*** -350.9*** -184.0*** -179.4*** -184.6*** -186.4
[112.0] [104.4] [72.1] [31.6] [22.8] [29.5] [125.4]
MT 20k miles -379.7*** -345.8*** -171.7*** -179.6*** -156.8*** -152.5*** -124.7*
[65.1] [61.7] [43.1] [19.0] [14.2] [17.5] [70.7]
MT 30k miles -339.9*** -209.2*** -204.1*** -122.3*** -127.8*** -126.0*** -64.7
[45.2] [42.9] [30.5] [13.9] [10.9] [13.3] [58.3]
MT 40k miles -564.7*** -509.9*** -341.0*** -231.1*** -226.1*** -201.4*** -156.0**
[42.9] [40.0] [28.5] [13.3] [10.7] [13.3] [64.4]
MT 50k miles -1,094.9*** -901.0*** -504.1*** -280.2*** -264.5*** -249.2*** -224.0***
[37.2] [33.8] [24.4] [11.8] [9.7] [12.2] [68.2]
MT 60k miles -610.4*** -499.1*** -346.8*** -212.0*** -199.3*** -187.7*** -163.4**
[32.6] [28.9] [21.4] [10.9] [9.2] [11.8] [69.4]
MT 70k miles -381.6*** -284.1*** -310.9*** -243.7*** -235.5*** -212.4*** -184.6***
[29.7] [26.2] [19.7] [10.1] [8.6] [11.0] [67.3]
MT 80k miles -315.5*** -220.0*** -224.2*** -182.6*** -171.6*** -163.7*** -103.8
[24.0] [20.8] [16.1] [8.7] [7.7] [9.9] [63.4]
MT 90k miles -337.2*** -311.1*** -239.5*** -189.5*** -186.5*** -183.7*** -176.7***
[23.9] [20.6] [16.1] [8.9] [7.8] [10.2] [65.9]
MT 100k miles -402.2*** -412.9*** -331.6*** -226.7*** -212.3*** -212.3*** -177.8***
[21.8] [18.6] [15.0] [8.6] [7.8] [10.3] [67.6]
MT 110k miles 12.7 -4.7 -61.2*** -39.2*** -37.1*** -47.0*** -64.5
[24.3] [20.8] [17.0] [9.9] [8.9] [11.9] [80.0]
MT 120k miles -136.5*** -126.3*** -82.4*** -75.6*** -81.0*** -87.6*** -130.6
[28.6] [24.3] [20.2] [12.5] [11.6] [15.7] [111.8]













R-Squared 0.335 0.443 0.708 0.933 0.957 0.980 0.998
Observations 2,299,007 2,299,007 2,299,007 2,299,007 2,299,007 2,299,007 2,299,007
** p < .05;  *** p < .01
Table 3.  The Impact of 10,000-Mile Thresholds on Prices - Dealer Only
Dependent Variable: Auction Price for Car Sale